Australia’s anti-corruption commissioner has a trust problem. He needs to change course to fix it
- Written by William Partlett, Associate Professor of Public Law, The University of Melbourne
The commissioner of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), Paul Brereton, is once again facing criticism for his handling of a potential conflict of interest.
On Tuesday in a Senate estimates hearing, NACC Chief Executive Philip Reed faced difficult questions about why the NACC commissioner did not fully disclose to parliament the extent of his ongoing relationship with the inspector-general of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
This disclosure failure is far more than a small detail. It comes after a 2024 finding by the NACC inspector that Brereton engaged in “officer misconduct” in relation to a conflict of interest concerning the Robodebt scandal.
This again brings into question the commissioner’s ability to effectively manage conflicts of interest and avoid the perception of bias. In particular, it shows the defensive strategy Brereton and his team have taken to responding to these types of questions is backfiring.
To repair trust in his leadership and ensure the effectiveness of the NACC, Brereton must change course and be far more transparent and proactive.
Off to a bad start
In 2023, the Robodebt Royal Commission referred six officials involved in the scandal to the NACC for determinations of whether they engaged in “corrupt conduct”.
Prior to making this determination, Brereton publicly declared a conflict of interest on these referrals and stated he would remove himself from the decision-making process.
In June 2024, the NACC announced it would not be investigating the six officials.
Read more: The National Anti-Corruption Commission turns 2 – has it restored integrity to federal government?
After receiving hundreds of complaints about this decision, the inspector of the NACC – the watchdog of the watchdog – published a report finding the commissioner failed to fully remove himself from the decision-making process.
This failure, the report concluded, was “officer misconduct” because it could have led a reasonable person to think the decision not to investigate was biased.
From bad to worse
This year, members of parliament began to raise a new potential concern about the commissioner: the nature of his ongoing relationship with the ADF.
The precise details of this relationship are also important to public perception because of the large number of defence-related matters the NACC must consider.
In response to a range of formal questions from parliament, Brereton disclosed that he remained part of the ADF Reserve but had formally resigned his post at the Inspector General for the ADF.
In September, however, we learned this didn’t fully capture the nature of his continuing relationship with the ADF.
In particular, media reporting found a much closer relationship, including that the commissioner was continuing to provide “critical” capability to the Inspector General in an informal capacity.
This ongoing relationship raises concerns not just because of the nature of the NACC’s work. It also raises the possibility the commissioner failed to reveal the whole truth to parliament.
The watchdog’s trust problem
More broadly, these matters raise concerns the commissioner doesn’t understand how to effectively build public trust in his leadership.
The NACC was established in 2022 to restore public trust in the exercise of public power. This trust is crucial to the ongoing health of Australian democracy.
To perform its important duties, the NACC commissioner must be broadly trusted.
On this issue, Brereton has some making up to do.
This is not just because of the Robodebt case. It’s also because concerns about his leadership are eroding overall trust in the NACC.
The inspector of the NACC, Gail Furness, testified to Senate estimates on Tuesday. She said she didn’t expect the sheer volume of complaints that she has received over the past two years. These included complaints about slow processing times.
She also said the number of “quite complex matters” was “increasing”. This included, Furness said, 55 complaints she had recently received concerning the commissioner’s “ongoing engagement” with defence.
Defend and deflect
To date, the commissioner and his team have adopted a defensive strategy to this trust problem. Their strategy includes downplaying or minimising these concerns.
In 2024, the NACC even included on its website a page characterising some concerns as “misinformation”.
More recently, in response to the undisclosed relationship with the inspector general, Brereton simply stated:
any perceived or actual conflict of interest that arises is managed appropriately.
On Tuesday in Senate estimates, NACC CEO Philip Reed said:
if public confidence is being impacted, it’s not our work […] it’s actually the amount of negative material that emerges about us that we have virtually no means of addressing.
Building trust
The perceptions of bias at the root of this trust problem cannot be “managed appropriately”, downplayed or classified as misinformation. To really build trust, the NACC and its leadership team must fundamentally change course.
First, they must openly and fully acknowledge to the public anything that involves even a minor potential for a conflict of interest. A good start would be a public announcement that Brereton is severing all ties to the ADF.
Second, they must make it clear to the public how the commissioner is distancing himself from matters involving conflicts of interest. This must include far more details about how Brereton (or anyone else in the NACC leadership team) is being fully excluded from the decision-making process when a conflict of interest is declared.
It’s not too late for the NACC and its leadership team to regain public trust and perform the role they are paid to do: safeguard trust in public power.
The stakes are high. We need only look to the United States today to see the terrible consequences of low levels of trust in government.
Hopefully Brereton and his team will take this opportunity to change course.
Authors: William Partlett, Associate Professor of Public Law, The University of Melbourne
