As Israel invades again, Lebanon faces more turmoil and possible civil war. Here are 3 ways this could go
- Written by Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie University
Just two days after the US and Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in late February, Hezbollah opened a second front in the war by launching six rockets into Israel from Lebanon.
The rockets came as a surprise to many. Hezbollah, once one of Iran’s most powerful proxy fighting forces, had been severely weakened by Israel during 13 months of fighting from late 2023–24.
The militant group had also stopped firing rockets into Israel since signing a ceasefire agreement in November 2024.
According to the ceasefire, the Lebanese army was to take control of the territory south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its infrastructure. Hezbollah was also expected to move its fighters north of the river, about 30 kilometres from the border with Israel.
The Lebanese government and the Lebanese army then launched an enthusiastic public campaign to show their commitment to the systematic disarmament of Hezbollah’s fighters and dismantling of its missile launches.
But this has proved to be a monumentally difficult task for both the government and army.
The Israeli army has continued to carry out airstrikes on Hezbollah military sites and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah fighters on a near-daily basis since the ceasefire.
Hezbollah has repeatedly refused to disarm and withdraw north of the Litani River if these strikes continue.
So, the ceasefire deal was already shaky. And when fighting resumed earlier this month, Israel decided it was time to “finish the job” in Lebanon.
This week, it launched another ground invasion to completely destroy Hezbollah’s remaining military infrastructure, “just as was done against Hamas in Rafah, Beit Hanoun and the terror tunnels in Gaza”, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, said.
More than 1 million Lebanese people have already been displaced, leading to fears Israel will reoccupy southern Lebanon, as it did for 18 years from 1982 to 2000.
Read more: Israel has invaded Lebanon six times in the past 50 years – a timeline of events
There are three possible scenarios for what could happen next.
1. A short-term or “limited” ground operation
Israel does not want a return to its 18-year occupation, when it was dragged into a guerrilla war with Hezbollah and other groups, and by some estimates lost hundreds of soldiers.
A limited ground operation lasting a few weeks would therefore be the most desirable scenario to minimise troop casualties on the ground.
But this carries risk, too. A limited operation would make it difficult for the Israeli army to successfully destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Israel has attempted these types of limited operations in the past and so far failed to stop Hezbollah rockets. Hezbollah, too, is unlikely to want to de-escalate quickly.
As such, a limited ground operation seems unlikely.
2. A war of attrition that lasts for months
This is a more possible scenario since the Hezbollah–Israel conflict is closely linked to the US–Israel war on Iran.
It has become obvious that Iran is engaged in a war of attrition with its adversaries. The regime doesn’t need to “win” the war; it just needs to hold on long enough for the US and Israel to feel enough global and domestic pressure to stop. Then, the regime can claim “victory”.
In this scenario, Hezbollah is fully capable of mirroring this strategy. If it can withstand Israeli airstrikes, it can retaliate with the type of guerilla warfare it has successfully used in the past to drag Israel into a longer conflict.
There are already signs Hezbollah fighters are adopting these strategies.
3. Another major war that will lead to reoccupation
This is the most likely scenario with highest chance of regional ripple effects.
If Israel launches a much larger ground operation, it would be aimed at fundamentally reshaping the balance of power with Hezbollah and putting more pressure on the Lebanese government before engaging in any negotiations or diplomatic settlements.
This is typical of negotiating processes: one side uses excessive violence to try to establish “new facts on the ground” and gain more leverage before entering into talks.
However, this could result in major losses for the Israeli army, similar to those suffered during its 1982 invasion and subsequent occupation.
Another possible outcome is a power vacuum in Lebanon and the outbreak of another civil war.
A Lebanese civil war would have serious implications for the region, much as the last one did from 1975 to 1990. Then, Lebanon was torn apart by multiple armed militias with different (and often competing) agendas. Hezbollah emerged from the chaos, giving Iran a powerful proxy group to threaten Israel for decades to come.
A Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre, Lebanon, during the civil war in 1982.
Wikimedia Commons
There would most likely be a major surge of refugees across Lebanon’s borders, as well.
Lebanon is already a fragile and weak country, struggling to sustain some 250,000 Palestinian and 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Now, there are 1 million displaced Lebanese from the recent fighting.
This kind of disruption would no doubt spill over into Europe, with displaced people trying to seek refuge there, similar to the height of the Syrian civil war.
An Israeli reoccupation of southern Lebanon could also give Hezbollah a much-needed boost in legitimacy among the Lebanese people, if it is able to survive the war and targeted killings of its leaders.
Hezbollah will easily be able to frame its operations as a form of resistance or muqawama, much as it did in its early years. This could be viewed in several ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against the US and Israel.
Wherever this conflict goes, the Lebanese people – and beleaguered Lebanese state – will pay the highest price, trapped again in a geopolitical contest they didn’t start and feel powerless to stop.
Authors: Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie University
